for particular health endpoints or indicators; (3) design of the monitoring study; (4) actual conduct of the monitoring; (5) evaluation and interpretation of the scientific data, i.e., the scientific study; (6) dissemination of the results; (7) decisions to act, or not to act, in response to the results; and (8) actions (or inaction). While workers may have little potential choice in participating in decisions related to workplace monitoring, community residents can in principle demand participatory roles in all eight activities in exchange for their agreement to be the subjects of monitoring.
Toward an Ethical Theory for Human MonItorIng
Moral and legal inquiry in human monitoring addresses the behavior of particular actors deciding to undertake monitoring tests, designing and conducting the evaluation and disseminating the test results; and using the information. Ladd (4) argues that it is important to distinguish ethics from law, custom, institutional practices, and positive morality (the body of accepted popular beliefs): Ethics is concerned with what ought to be. Moral problems concerning human monitoring may be categorized as (a) conflicts arising from differences in legitimate interests of different actors/institutions; (b) confficts in moral and legal duties of each actor/institution; and (c) conflicts among actors/institutions arising from different perceptions of what is right or wrong, fair or unfair. In addition to conflicts, there is the perennial problem of how much (information, safety, precaution, etc.) is enough to justify intervention, and the difficulty of responding responsibly to events and information when people are experiencing stress and misperception. Individuals possess certain rights, and those rights impose (moral) obligations on others. Rights and obligations must be viewed together in the context of particular relationships (5). Ladd and others argue that people have a general duty to support the fulfillment of the moral requirements of relationships, whether their own or those of others. Some of this is embodied in rights and obligations, which is sometimes given the force of law. The delineation of rights and duties gives rise to certain expectations or hopes on the part of society concerning human behavior. The law often embodies societal attitudes, values, and expectations. Sometimes, but not always, this occurs when a significant societal consensus has been reached on a particular moral question. The law establishes legal rights, whose violation may be illegal, and the law provides remedies to correct their violation. But the law also recognizes that conflicts of legitimate interests, conflicts of legal duties, and differences in perception of what is right or wrong, fair or unfair, require a balancing in the fashioning of remedies. Indeed, there are both legal remedies (usually of statutory origin) and equitable remedies that give great discretionary power to the courts or adjudicating institutions, such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in the US. Rules are embodied in legislation and regulations; legal principles guide, but do not unequivocally settle, other conflicts. The law does indeed view behavior in the context of relationships. One party's justifiable expectations of another are translated into the legal concept of reliance. Thus, the law will sometimes find a physician-patient relationship between worker and company physician-when none was intended by the physician-because it was reasonable that the worker expected certain behavior or information from the physician.
Similarly, although personal liability by corporate officers or employees is limited (6), the courts will "pierce the corporate veil" when corporate behavior violates the ethical norm. Discrimination law is replete with discretionary justice (7). The law, of course, does not always serve the ethical interests of the society so nobly. Legislation and legal institutions can be compromised by powerful special interests.
Moreover, if societal consensus or interest about a moral issue is lacking, the law may either not address that issue or fail to give helpful guidance concerning the boundaries of fair or equitable behavior. This is currently the case concerning the problems encountered in community monitoring.
In the context of the transfer of medical information resulting from workplace monitoring and discrimination resulting from its use, the legal and ethical norms are in a great state of flux. Confficts of interest and conflicts of duty (for example, for the company physician or government officials) abound. The worker would rather be safe and keep his or her job; the employer wants to limit his or her legal and economic liability.
In the face of great uncertainty, the actors generally prefer to take few chances, so that very different policies are preferred regarding the transmission of uncertain information, possibly derived from imperfect screening tests, and its use. federal agency requires that monitoring be done, the worker may validly object only through asserting a statutory or constitutional violation. The US Congress specifically acknowledged the need to balance interests when an employee asserts a religious objection to a monitoring procedure.
Workplace Monitoring RequiringWorkers to Submitto Human Monitoring
Human monitoring can also impinge on the worker's constitutional right to privacy, i.e., the right to physical privacy, and the right to withhold information likely to prove detrimental to one's self-interest. If an employee does not wish to comply with a monitoring procedure required by agency regulation, imposing that procedure as a condition of employment may invade that employee's constitutional right to physical privacy. In some cases, it may infringe the right to be free from unwelcome physical intrusions and the right to make decisions regarding one's own body. The former is grounded in the Fourth Amendment's proscription against unreasonable search and seizure, whereas the latter is closely associated with the rights of personal privacy commonly identified with the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.
Although protected by the Constitution, these rights of privacy are not inviolate.
US courts have recognized a general need to balance the privacy interests of the individual with the public health interests of society. To date, no reported judicial decision has mentioned an asserted constitutional right to refuse participation in human monitoring as a condition of employment. Nevertheless, one can identify the factors that would be considered in an evaluation of that right. The public health significance of human monitoring, when properly used, is difficult to deny. Gathering information through human monitoring to develop standards for the protection of workers' health, or for the enforcement or evaluation of existing standards, serves an important public health purpose. The fact that this public health interest parallels the affected worker's own interest in a healthy workplace may make monitoring a less onerous invasion of privacy than it would be otherwise.
Indeed 
setting.
Similarly, the doctrine of informed consent is tied closely to the concept of medical treatment. It assumes that not only is the patient being requested to submit to a procedure designed for his or her own benefit, but also that the patient is in a position to make a voluntary choice to participate. Human monitoring calls both of these assumptions into question. Not only may monitoring not be "treatment" in the conventional sense of the word but also in many cases, it benefits the employer more than the employee and is usually compulsory treat as confidential whatever is learned about individuals served, releasing information only when required by law or by over-riding public health considerations, or to other physicians at the request of the individual according to traditional medical ethical practice; and should recognize that employers are entitled to counsel about the medical fitness of individuals in relation to work, but are not entitled to diagnoses or details of a specific nature.
Under this formulation, although the physician may not disclose to the employer the specific results of human monitoring, the employee's job security may be endangered nonetheless as a result of "counsel about the medical fitness of individuals in relation to work" A preferable alternative practice (10) would involve the worker in such discussions between the physician and the employer.
Dissemination of Monitoring Results
Employee's right of access. An employer may not limit or deny an employee access to his or her medical or exposure records, according to the OSHA regulation promulgated on May 23, 1980. Furthermore, the employer is required to reserve and maintain these records for an extended period of time. [In the absence of OSHA regulation, employees would arguably still have a right of access under common law or state statute in many jurisdictions (11).] There appears to be some overlap in the definition of "medical" and "exposure" records, because both may include the results of biologic monitoring. The former, however, is generally defined as those records pertaining to "the health status of an employee," while the latter is defined as those pertaining to "employee exposure to toxic substances or harmful physical agents."
The regulations provide that, upon any employee's request for access to a medical or exposure record, "the employer shall assure that access is provided in a reasonable time, place, and manner, but in no event later than fifteen (15) days after the request for access is made." In addition to the right of access, there are duties to inform workers of exposure to occupational hazards (12).
Employees' right to confidentiality.
Of all of the issues raised by human monitoring, employee confidentiality may have received the most attention (13). An employee's right to maintain the confidentiality of information regarding his or her body and health places a significant limitation on the ways in which others can use that information. As programs of human monitoring are developed, mechanisms must be found that maximize both the employee's interest in privacy and society's interest in promoting general workplace health and safety. In the final analysis, this may be more a technological challenge than a legal or ethical one.
In a broad sense, private citizens do have a right to protect the confidentiality of information about their personal health through the US Bifi of Rights and state law. In the medical setting, this right grows out of the confidential nature of the physician-patient relationship, although it exists outside this relationship as well. In essence, the recognition of a right of privacy reflects an ongoing societal belief in the need to protect the integrity of the individual. This right to privacy, however, is not absolute and may be limited or waived. US courts nonetheless remain vigilant in their attempts to protect individual privacy. They prefer an approach that permits both the use of health information for a socially useful purpose and the protection of the privacy of the individual. The key is the development of information-based technology that will make that approach more readily available. 
Common law limitations.
In early common law (courtdeveloped law through successive cases), an employer had the right to take an employee's health into account in determining whether to continue to employ that person. If the employment contract was "open," with no definite term, the employee could be discharged for any reason, including health status, at the will of the employer. If the contract of employment was for a definite term, the employee could be discharged for "just cause." Typically, significant illness or disability constituted "just cause." Although federal labor law, workers' compensation, and recent common law limitations on the doctrine of "employment at will" have profoundly affected the nature of Many of these may apply to an employer's use of human monitoring information.
A detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this article, but their potential impact on human monitoring is outlined below.
Section 11(c) of the OSHAct prohibits employers from discharging or otherwise discriminating against any employee "because of the exercise by such employee on behalf of himself or others of any right afforded by this chapter." If an employee insists on retaining ajob in the face of medical data indicating that continued exposure to a workplace toxicant will likely pose a danger to health, the employee may well be asserting a right afforded by the OSHAct. The Act's general duty clause imposes on employers a duty to maintain a workplace that is free of "recognized hazards" likely to cause death or serious physical harm. Inferentially, then, the Act vests employees with a concomitant right to insist that their workplace be free of such hazards. Accordingly, an employer who discharges or otherwise discriminates against a worker because of perceived susceptibility to a toxic exposure arguably violates the prohibition of section 11(c). When an employer asserts that an employee cannot work without injury to health, the employer tacitly admits that the workplace is unsafe. meaning that the practice must be "necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the business." If the plaintiff can establish that another, less discriminatory practice will accomplish the same purpose, the defense of business necessity will not stand.
if a practice is discriminatory on its face or involves disparate treatment, the employer may avoid liability only by demonstrating that the basis of the discrimination constitutes a bona fide occupational qualification. This defense is available under the Civil Rights Act for discrimination based on sex, national origin, or religion (but not for discrimination based on race or color) and under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The defense requires the employer to establish that the discriminatory practice is "reasonably necessary to the normal operation of business." However, the US Supreme Court has characterized the defense as an "extremely narrow" one.
There are two principal reasons why business necessity may be difficult to establish for exclusionary practices based on human monitoring data. First, most of these practices are not designed to protect the health and safety of the public or of other workers. Instead, their business purpose is the protection of the excluded worker and, not incidentally, the protection of the employer from the anticipated costs associated with the potential illness of that worker (22). As noted in one analysis, "the courts are usually skeptical of an employer's argument that it refuses to hire qualified applicants for their own good, and they often require a higher level of justification in these cases than in cases in which public safety is at stake" (23 This could be one area in which good law and good social policy coincide.
Use of MonitoringData in Tort and Workers' Compensation
Cases From a legal perspective, the most important impact of human monitoring information may be its use as evidence in tort and workers' compensation cases to address how we know whether a particular exposure caused a particular person's medical condition. At present, the problem remains a major one, except for exposure to a few substances, such as vinyl chloride and asbestos. Human monitoring has the potential to bring about a change in the nature of the evidence used in these cases. is not yet clear, and because the evidence of immune system damage was not always considered persuasive.
Although human monitoring may not be able to tie particular immune system deficiencies to particular exposures, it should be able to establish with greater certainty whether immune system damage has, in fact, occurred.
It is quite possible that further developments in the science of biomarkers will permit the identification of "chemical fingerprints"-a distinctive change in the DNA that can be linked with exposure to a particular chemical or class of chemicals. At the very least, this should make it much easier to distinguish those who have been exposed to a particular chemical in the workplace from those who have not, and to identify which of the many potential defendants was responsible. More importantly, it should eventually permit the correlation of particular cases of diseases such as cancer with exposure to particular chemicals (or classes of chemicals).
PossibleSolutionsin the Workplace
With legal and ethical norms in flux, it is important to examine the policy options for dealing with future and continuing ethical workplace dilemmas. Possible strategies include: 1) Encouraging ethical enquiry in the conduct and use of medical screening, i.e., educating workers, management, and health professionals to think more seriously about the problems. Indeed, ethicists should be consulted in designing the screening programs.
2) Using legislative
and regulatory means to clarify rights and duties, such as encouraging OSHA to promulgate a generic earnings and job security protection requirement for all cases of medical removal, or enacting legislation that requires workers to be notified of occupational risks and prohibits discrimination outright.
3)
Encouraging the use of self-help techniques by workers, e.g., union bargaining, the filing of discrimination complaints, and the right to refuse hazardous work. 4) Encouraging better disposition of confficts by improving procedural fairness in attempts at resolution, such as full and complete disclosure of information to workers, the better maintenance of confidentiality of worker records, or the use of corporate ombudspersons.
5) Sharing decision-making through encouraging development of joint health and safety committees.
The choice of options at any one time reflects the seriousness with which society wishes to address the moral and legal dilemmas. Thinking about the problems is a first and necessary step (26-29).
Legal and EthIcal Problems In Community MonItoring
Experience with three contaminated communitiesLove Canal, NY; Woburn, MA; and the state of Michigan-reveals a rich picture of conflicts and problems.
The trench that was Love Canal was gilled with municipal and industrial wastes before it was covered in dirt and sold, as part of a larger parcel, to the Niagara Falls Board of Education. The Board built a school on the site and sold other portions to real estate developers who, over the next two decades, constructed singlefamily homes along its borders (2). In 1978, the landfill oozed toxic chemicals into the environment of a middleclass community.
A relatively high incidence of leukemia among children in the neighborhood of Walker Pond initiated the episode at Woburn, MA. Residents quickly focused on the sometimes malodorous drinking water as the probable culprit; two wells that contributed to the supply in recent times had been closed when found to contain toxic organic compounds (2). Deformed and dying cattle led to the discovery of toxic contamination in Michigan. Inadvertent mixing of a flame retardant with cattle feed, leading to production of contaminated dairy products, eggs, and meat, exposed virtually the entire population of Michigan to a variety of brominated organic compounds.
The continuous, although decreasing, toxic exposure of a variety of live-stock and of human consumers persisted for several years after the initial mishap (2).
Conflicts of Interest
There were conflicts of legitimate interests at every stage of monitoring activity, both early and late, in the three contamination episodes. The conflicts generating the most hostility occurred between government agency personnel and community residents, often due to the agency's concern for the overall health of the entire public within their jurisdiction, vs the community's more parochial and environmental concerns and individuals' private concerns. Similarly, agencies and citizens often had different interests with respect to the distribution of costs and benefits. Conflicts of interests also existed between the government and the entity responsible for the contamination-which were significant sources of discord during the first two monitoring stages ("hazard recognition" and "decision to monitor"), the next two stages ("decision to act" and "action"), and the fifth stage ("evalnation of monitoring data"). Conflicts of interest between citizens who were activists (in favor of monitoring and remedial action) and people affiliated with the entity responsible for pollution were substantial during the same five stages. Finally, the conflicts of legitimate interests between scientists and government (especially public health agencies) were prominent, beginning with the stage "design of the monitoring study" and ending with the "decision to act" stage.
In anticipation of possible criticism for omitting discussion of conflicts of interest with the news media, let me note that I have included local media in the category of people affiliated primarily with the contaminated community.
These individuals were indeed influential and helped to shape the course of events; however, their role appeared to be investigative and (or) supportive of community activists rather than independent in character. The regional and national media were not observed to initiate conifict, and actually did not appear on the scene until late in the episodes. The exception to this rule occurs when a community is ignorant of the potential hazard and informed by media coverage, e.g., as happened with the pesticide ethylene dibromide. In such cases, the national media actually assumes the more activist role of the local media in service of the potentially exposed community, which includes the entire population of the US.
Internal conflicts among duties in these incidents led to psychological distress and sometimes to unethical behavior, particularly in community residents torn between a duty to be well informed (so as to anticipate and respond appropriately to danger) and a duty to maintain their own peace of mind (being conducive to rational thought) and a calm exterior for the benefit of their families. The latter duty prompted many residents to avoid distressing information or to deny its significance. Public health professionals experienced internal confficts between their duties to prevent panic in the community and to warn the public of potential danger, as well as between the duties associated with their various roles as scientists, wage earners, public servants, and employees of a particular branch, unit, and level of government.
Other individuals who worked for governmental agencies experienced conflicts as a result of multiple roles as defenders and regulators of a particular client group-e.g., farmers. Private physicians were faced with the sometimes conflicting desires to help community members cope with their fears, to protect the health of their patients, to maintain their professional standing in the community, and to avoid taking responsibility for decisions with regard to issues beyond their expertise. People affiliated with the entity that caused the contamination also faced conflicting duties-loyalty to the entity; obligation to the community (because of their special knowledge); and obligations to families, friends, and the community as a whole if they resided locally. Most of these internal conflicts permeated all stages of monitoring activity, both early and late in the episodes.
Confficts among values of different key actors centered around the relative significance of "subjective" vs "objective" information and the nature and degree of uncertainty, error, and risk that is tolerable or that should be addressed by the managers of hazards. Residents and agency professionals disagreed about which of these issues should be addressed by the managers.
They even disagreed about which of these issues was more important-i.e., problem definition-and therefore about what were appropriate solutions. Residents worried about experts' ability to assess and control risk, while "experts" fretted about citizens' unreasonable demands for certainty. The views expounded were not universally held by all actors affiliated in the same group. Rather, conflicts occurred between those who were trained and socialized in a technical field and those who identified more with humanistic traditions. These conflicts drove a wedge between actors, initially when they considered the need for monitoring and later when they considered the need for acting in response to monitoring results and in evaluating the monitoring data, but the conflicts also influenced the other monitoring stages.
The problem inherent in dealing with complex issues that are surrounded by scientific uncertainty-that has been encapsulated by "How much information is enough?"-fueled disputes during the stages of "design of monitoring studies" as well as, to a lesser extent, during "hazard recognition," "decision to monitor," "evaluation of monitoring data," "dissemination of information," "decision to act," and "action." Tied to this issue, in every case, is the related question, "Who should decide?" Stress afflicted key actors faced with unprecedented situations, scientific uncertainty, and a need to make decisions quickly. Before the discovery of contaminated communities became common, people in government were subjected to enormous political and personal pressures and placed in a no-win position. Today, professionals have the benefit of past experiences and specialized training. Finally, there is the problem of misperceptions and misunderstanding when actors observe the activities of people whose frame of reference differs from their own. People afflicted within each group may misconstrue the meaning of events, misinterpret verbal and written communications, and attribute negative motives to silence or to an unexpected absenceof apparent activity. Each may be acutely aware of his or her own responsibilities and attitudes but quite ignorant of the responsibilities and attitudes of others. The obvious solution is to increase opportunities for actors to get to know one another and to interact in a positive way. They need to discover common goals, to realize constraints that shape the attitudes and actions of other groups, and to form realistic expectations with regard to the timing and substance of monitoring activities.
Nevertheless
Ideally, communication between agencies and citizens would commence before a problem occurs, but, in any case, communication should be initiated with vigor as early as possible, even before a hazard is given official status. Only through a convincing display of openness and respect for the abilities and trustworthiness of others will trust be reciprocated. Openness, in fact and in appearance, of the actors' minds and of decisionmaking procedures is the antithesis of secrecy. Citizens in a democratic society insist on their right to observe government in action and, therefore, to hold public servants accountable for their part in decisions (31). Although the majority of citizens may never exercise their right, the knowledge that they may do so, and that some other citizens do watch over government, gives reassurance to everyone that democracy is safe. In contrast, the merest hint of secrecy by elected or appointed public officials enrages many citizens, absent a strong and reasonable argument that secrecy protects some other more basic right-e.g., to privacy for individuals.
Resolution of Conflicts
Demands for access to information about activities in the past asserts a citizen's right to retroactively "observe" decision-makers. The distinction between the first committee and the second is that the first is restricted to "independent experts," whereas the second is representative and need not be "expert." Both are permanent and statewide and perform the same functional tasks. The third committee is an expert review or evaluating committee that operates statewide but reviews studies at many particular sites. The fourth and fifth committees operate at the community level and perform similar functions but differ as to composition.
Even with regard to citizen panels, there is wide vari- Obviously, these measures should be utilized in such a way as to not unduly impede rapid and timely action.
Both new laws and institutions as well as ad hoc or informal mechanisms are needed to more fully involve the affected public and other key actors in monitoring. In general, the earlier that key actors are involved in the activities comprising human monitoring, the more effectively can adverse effects and loss of trust be avoided or minimized.
Specific policy initiatives can be conveniently grouped into areas that build skills and capabifity in the community; build skifis and capability in the agencies; increase specific authority for (and obligations of) government; provide increased community participation through access to government decisions; provide adequate incentives and motivation to agency personnel;
and provide for more, more predictable and better communication.
Communities are just beginning to explore ways to address the above activities.
Law provides little structare at this time. Finally, community demands for health studies should be recognized as a community's means of getting governmental attention-and perhaps action-either to relieve the community of its concerns or to assist the community in dealing with a bona fide health problem. Many monitoring studies are unlikely to yield scientifically significant results because they involve a small population, low-dose exposures, indeterminate latency periods, etc. This problem partly explains the reluctance of some community residents to participate in monitoring. The proper response of government, then, is to decide either that it is willing to take remedial action even if a study does not reach statistical significance, or that it will take action on the evidence of significant exposure alone.
